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Abstract
A recent French reform has revised the legal definition of the corporation. In essence, the law stipulates that the corporation 
must be run with due regard to the social and environmental impacts of its activity. It also introduces the notion of raison 
d’être and affords the possibility for any corporation to assign social or environmental purposes to itself, defined in its by-
laws. This reform is similar to recent reforms in the UK and the US, but is based on an original and distinctive theoretical 
argument. The aim of our article is to analyze the fundamental tenets of this reform and their implications for the theory of 
the corporation. It shows that the new law is based on a new positive definition of the enterprise as not only an economic 
organization or a productive entity, but more fundamentally a space for innovative collective action. We argue that this view 
of the enterprise challenges our conceptualization of the corporation in two important ways. First, it shows that the traditional 
theories overlook the activities of the enterprise and their related impacts, and that the corporation is not necessarily the 
appropriate legal vehicle for the innovative enterprise. Second, it suggests that the stipulation of the enterprise’s purpose or 
raison d’être in the corporate by-laws can provide new promising legal foundations for corporate responsibility.
Keywords Corporate law · Corporate responsibility · Purpose-driven corporation
In May 2019, the French parliament passed a new law revis-
ing the definition of a corporation, especially the treatment 
of corporate purpose. This law introduces three elements: 
(i) an obligation to consider the social and environmental 
implications of the business activity; (ii) an option for any 
company to define its raison d’être; and (iii) a new type of 
corporate form, the ‘société à mission,’ for companies that 
adopt social or environmental goals by writing them into the 
company’s by-laws and by setting up an ad hoc committee 
to monitor them.
This reform is a part of an international movement that 
started a few years ago, in particular with the introduction 
of new corporate forms, such as Benefit Corporations (BCs), 
which have now been written into the laws of 33 Ameri-
can states (André 2012; Hiller 2013; Hemphill and Cullari 
2014). These new corporate forms were created in the US 
“to enhance CSR by providing legal protections to manage-
ments that want both to maximize shareholder income and 
to pursue a social or environmental agenda” (André 2012, p. 
133). In France, the reform also aims to increase corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and to restore trust in corpo-
rations, but the justification differs. Unlike the American 
case, in France a director does not have a specific fiduciary 
duty that would prevent him or her from prioritizing social 
and environmental goals over shareholders’ interests. The 
introduction of the société à mission is motivated by another 
and original argument, as the Minister of Economy and 
Finance, Le Maire, stated during the parliamentary debates. 
He argued that the Napoleonic Code is “absolutely inad-
equate in so far it considers [the enterprise] from the angle 
of the corporation only (…). Renaming things and doing so 
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truthfully is extremely important.” [Bulletin Officiel: 9637, 
our translation].
This reform has come at a time when scholars are increas-
ingly questioning the merits and legitimacy of the corpora-
tion (Clarke et al. 2019). While corporations indisputably 
create value for their various stakeholders, their interests 
are not necessarily correlated with the collective inter-
est (Margolis and Walsh 2003; Scherer and Palazzo 2007; 
Lazonick 2014). As they have become global and extraor-
dinarily powerful organizations, it has also become clear 
that they can threaten social equilibria as well as life itself 
on our planet (Metcalf and Benn 2012). Therefore, scholars 
are increasingly calling into question corporate governance 
and the legal features of the corporation, such as limited 
liability (Ireland 2010; Mayer 2013; Ciepley 2018). In this 
context, the French corporate law reform may be meaning-
ful for the debate on the corporation and the legal condi-
tions of corporate responsibility. The aim of the article is 
therefore to answer the following questions. First, why is it 
that distinguishing the enterprise from the corporation is so 
important and what are the fundamental tenets underpinning 
the amendment of the articles defining the corporation in the 
Civil Code, which had remained practically unchanged since 
1804? Second, what are the theoretical implications of these 
arguments and to what extent do they challenge or enrich our 
views of the corporation?
We were able to collect extensive data relating to the 
period that saw the genesis of Articles 169 and 176 of the 
PACTE Law (Plan d’Action pour la Croissance et la Trans-
formation des Entreprises [Action Plan for the Growth 
and Transformation of Business Enterprises], (2008–2018 
period), as we were participating in a research program on 
the forms, foundations and possible reforms of French cor-
porate governance.1 However, to characterize the theoreti-
cal background and implications of the reform, this article 
focuses specifically on the Notat-Senard Report. This report 
was commissioned in January 2018 by the French govern-
ment from Notat and Senard,2 who were asked to look for 
ways to reconcile the interests of corporations and the col-
lective interest. While various institutional reports have been 
produced over the past years on the topic of reforming cor-
porate purpose, the Notat-Senard Report directly inspired 
the final text of the law and was the main reference both 
in the parliamentary debates and in the press. It offered a 
detailed analysis of the issues, with sound arguments and 
evidence, and played a decisive role by synthesizing previ-
ous research and directly informing the government’s draft 
bill. The report consists of 122 pages, with numerous histori-
cal and academic references. Its authors heard the testimony 
of more than 200 people within the span of a few weeks, 
most of whom were from the corporate world.3 Our analysis 
will therefore focus primarily on this report, its assessment 
of the current situation and contemporary challenges, and 
the justifications for the recommendations that it makes.
We show that the Notat-Senard Report proposes a change 
in corporate law based on a new positive view of the enter-
prise: It argues that the enterprise emerged very late, com-
pared to the corporation, and as a distinctive economic 
organization. While the corporation—as a legal form—was 
already liberalized and widely used by merchants and pro-
ducers to share profits and losses in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, the modern enterprise emerged only at the very end of 
the nineteenth century, spawned by the upsurge of scien-
tific and technological research and development in indus-
try. This singular organization was not only productive and 
commercial but also creative: its purpose was not only to 
produce existing goods, but also to develop new goods and 
services, and therefore also to create new technologies, and 
new competencies, jobs and methods.
This view of the enterprise as a locus for collective crea-
tion challenges our conceptualization of the corporation in 
two important ways.
First, it shows that the corporation is not necessarily the 
appropriate legal vehicle for the enterprise. While the term 
‘corporation’ is often used interchangeably with the term 
‘enterprise,’ the literature has clearly distinguished the two 
words: the enterprise as the ‘organized economic activity’ 
on the one hand, and the corporation as a legal instrument or 
legal personhood on the other (Robé 2011; Deakin 2017). By 
doing so, the literature approaches the enterprise by default 
as just a reference to define the corporation. The Notat-
Senard Report shows that this approach to the enterprise by 
default is misleading because it overlooks why the enterprise 
has emerged only recently as a very distinctive form of eco-
nomic organization. As the process of collective creation can 
directly impact our lifestyles and transform our societies, one 
has to take into account a contingency parameter which is 
the nature of the business and its purpose. Up until now, the 
theories of the corporation have disregarded the nature of 
the activities undertaken by the enterprise, as well as their 
ultimate purpose. We argue that it is necessary to reappraise 
1 Research Program at the Collège des Bernardins (2009–2018), led 
by Favereau (Roger 2012; Favereau and Roger 2015; Segrestin and 
Vernac 2018).
2 Nicole Notat is the former director of the CFDT (one of the leading 
labor unions) and the founder of the first extra-financial rating agency 
in France (Vigéo Eiris). Jean-Dominique Senard is currently the pres-
ident of Renault but at the time was the CEO of Michelin. While it 
draws on several institutional reports, as well as almost 200 hearings, 
the Notat-Senard Report builds upon academic research to suggest a 
new theoretical view of the enterprise.
3 Specifically, 57 people from the public sphere, 121 from the corpo-
rate sphere (including the non-profit sector) and 34 from academia.
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our distinction between the enterprise and the corporation, 
and to recognize that while the corporation was conceived 
as the legal vehicle for productive activity, it may not be 
the appropriate tool for the enterprise of collective creation.
Second, this new positive view also proposes that corpo-
rate responsibility cannot be considered independently of the 
activities undertaken and their objectives, and thus it entails 
new governance mechanisms. From this point of view, the 
French reform of corporate law adds to the growing body 
of research that is critically examining the legitimacy of the 
corporate form and exploring alternative forms. The French 
reform proposes that stipulating a raison d’être and the 
related social and environmental objectives in the by-laws 
of the corporation is a way to give a legal existence to the 
enterprise per se into corporate law. Therefore, enterprises 
are invited to clearly set out their intended contribution to 
society and the environment, and to proactively engage their 
responsibility for the futures they aim at producing. The 
reform thus invites us to consider the responsibility of the 
enterprise for the future it creates, and opens new avenues 
for scholars to think about the legal foundations of corporate 
responsibility.
The article is organized as follows. First, after some clari-
fications of the terminology used in relation to the enterprise 
and the corporation, we briefly review the different concep-
tualizations of the corporation and the various contemporary 
debates about how to increase CSR and to reconcile the cor-
porate interest with the public interest. We show how these 
debates have led to different legal movements, including the 
movement of purpose-with-profits corporations in the US. 
In the second section, we present the French reform, first 
positioning it in the historical context and then comparing it 
with similar legal movements in the UK and the US. In the 
third section, our analysis of the Notat-Senard Report shows 
that while the French reform includes some of the features 
of these movements, it builds upon an original view of the 
enterprise.4 In the fourth section, we discuss the implications 
of this view, both on the theoretical distinction between the 
enterprise and the corporation, and on the ways to improve 
corporate responsibility in the twenty-first century.
The View of the Corporation on Trial
The corporation is often considered as “the primary instru-
ment for wealth generation in contemporary economies,” 
and its evolving role in society has called for multiple 
interpretations (Clarke et al. 2019). In this section, we pre-
sent the main theories of the corporation and the related 
debates in the literature before providing an overview of 
the reforms initiated or undertaken to make the corporation 
more sustainable and responsible.
Enterprise vs Corporation
To review the theories of the corporation, we first need to 
clarify the distinction between the words enterprise and cor-
poration. While in French the words entreprise and société 
are clearly distinct, in the English-speaking world the terms 
‘enterprise’ and ‘corporation,’ or ‘firm,’ are often used syn-
onymously. For instance, O’Kelley states that “in a typologi-
cal sense, the modern corporation is an American business 
firm characterized by separation of ownership and control” 
(O’Kelley 2019).
But these terms need to be distinguished. Robé argues 
that:
They correspond, however, to totally different con-
cepts: a corporation is a legal instrument, with a sepa-
rate legal personality, which is used to legally structure 
the firm; a firm is an organized economic activity, cor-
porations being used to legally structure most firms of 
some significance (Robé 2011, p. 3).
Similar to Robé, several authors distinguish between the 
enterprise as an economic and/or productive organization 
and its legal vehicle, namely, the corporation (Teubner 1988; 
Robé 1999, 2011). For example, Chandler (1977) spoke of a 
“modern business enterprise” and not a modern corporation, 
as did Berle and Means (1932). Deakin views the enterprise 
as “an organization engaged in the production of goods or 
services, to which end it combines physical, human and 
virtual assets” (Deakin 2012, p. 350), while he defines the 
corporation as “a legal mechanism, and the principal legal-
institutional device through which business firms operate in 
contemporary market economies” (Ibid., p. 351).5
In our case, this distinction is important to avoid any 
translation issue from French. We will therefore use the term 
‘enterprise’ in the same way as the French termentreprise 
to refer to the business organization, regardless of its legal 
4 It is worth emphasizing that our aim is not to study the social 
movement dynamics (Djelic 2013) that resulted in the new law. 
Thus, it is not our intention to analyze the political scene or processes 
whereby different groups lobbied or influenced the reform.
5 Similarly, Rajan and Zingales define the enterprise as the “unit of 
economic organization” (Rajan and Zingales 2000, p. 24), in contrast 
with the corporation, which is concerned with “ownership of assets” 
(Ibid., p. 25).
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form.6 By contrast, the term ‘corporation’ refers to the legal 
vehicle of business organizations.7
An Overview of the Theories of the Corporation
The corporation is thus primarily a legal device. In its mod-
ern legal form, it has three singular features. Marie-Laure 
Djelic summarizes these three features in the following way:
First, it is treated as a fictional individual. As a legal 
entity in its own right, the corporation exists, poten-
tially, in perpetuity […]. As a legal entity, the corpo-
ration is protected by strong asset partitioning and it 
benefits from complete entity shielding.[…] Second, 
ownership of the modern corporation means the hold-
ing of shares. In its modern form, corporate ownership 
tends to be dispersed and shares are easily transferable 
and marketable.[…] Third, modern corporate share 
ownership is associated with the principle of limited 
liability. (Djelic 2013, p. 596).
To explain these legal features and interpret the role of 
corporate law, different theories have been put forward.
State/Private and Aggregate/Separate Entities: The Main 
Dimensions
We can roughly differentiate the theories of the corpora-
tion along two main lines. First, the corporation is seen as 
either a special entity, distinct from its shareholders, or as an 
aggregation of its members. Second, the corporation is either 
created by the state or is the result of private initiative. The 
prevailing doctrine in the early nineteenth century clearly 
recognized the corporation as an entity in its own right [“its 
power to sue and amenity to suit and its durational exist-
ence defined without regard to the lives of its shareholders” 
(Millon 1990, p. 206)]. The corporation was also ‘artificial,’ 
that is, it was created only though a special chartering by the 
state (Roy 2019). The privileges of limited liability were 
conferred only for the purpose of general welfare. In this 
view, the state is the source of managerial power, and the 
principle of ultra vires indicated that “a corporation could 
not bind itself contractually concerning a matter that was 
beyond the objectives defined in its charters” (Millon 1990, 
p. 209). Thus, the shareholders, even unanimously, could not 
create power not conferred by the state.
In contrast with the idea of an artificial entity created by 
the state, the corporation was later conceptualized in the 
twentieth century as a ‘natural’ entity (created freely at the 
private initiative of shareholders). This legal ‘contractual-
ism’ (Dine 2000) was made possible by the liberalization of 
limited liability, the generalization of the standard of incor-
poration for any lawful purpose in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, and the disappearance of the ultra vires doctrine (Djelic 
2013; Ireland 2010; Guinnane et al. 2007, 2017). In the early 
twentieth century, the corporation was thus seen as a natu-
ral entity, albeit still as a separate legal entity. The separate 
legal entity was put forward in the attempts to conceptualize 
corporate social responsibility; it allowed managers to act 
as trustees of the corporation (Dodd 1932). But gradually, 
the legal contractualism made way to a more economic con-
tractualism in which the corporation is no longer a separate 
entity. Instead, it is an ‘aggregation’ of its shareholders, with 
no distinct personality (Millon 1990; Dine 2000). Accord-
ingly, the corporation has no separate existence, and is 
reduced to a mere nexus of contracts, with the shareholders 
as the main principals (Bratton 1989). The source of mana-
gerial powers then comes from the shareholders themselves, 
“with directors enjoying only such responsibility as actually 
was delegated” (Millon 1990, p. 215). Corporate law would 
thus be less concerned by the regulation of the corporation’s 
relationship with society than by the internal aspects of cor-
porate governance.
As we know from the literature on corporate governance, 
this view was widespread in the twentieth century. However, 
the debate is ongoing. Scholars have shown that considering 
the corporation as a nexus of contracts or as a “legal fic-
tion” (Jensen and Meckling 1976) poses various problems. 
From an institutional perspective, the corporation is created 
by a “constitutional contract” (Grandori 2010): this type 
of contract not only regulates what is done or exchanged, 
but also how to decide. As it defines only decision proce-
dures and rights, it is seen as an effective mode of govern-
ing under increasing levels of uncertain (Grandori 2010, 
2019). Emphasis is also placed on the fact that the corpora-
tion is not a pure economic and transactional organization 
(Deakin et al. 2017). For example, the importance of entity 
shielding has been demonstrated (Hansmann and Kraakman 
2000), along with that of corollary risks to the corporate veil 
(Millon 2007). Ciepley notes that “Entity shielding simply 
cannot be secured through private contract. It requires the 
legal fiat of the state. And incorporation can be seen as a 
6 The ‘firm’ is a fourth term, which we equate to the enterprise. 
Deakin et  al. (2017, p. 194), for instance, distinguish the firm from 
the corporation as follows: “We use the term ‘firm’ to apply to indi-
viduals or organizations with the legally recognized capacity to pro-
duce goods or services for sale. A corporation is a kind of firm; it has 
a structure as designated under corporate law. All corporations are 
firms, but not all firms are corporations” (Deakin et al. 2017).
7 To avoid translation issues, we will clarify our choice of ter-
minology. In line with American usage, we use the word  ‘com-
pany’ (société in French) to refer to both the partnership and the cor-
poration. But most of the time, we use the term ‘corporation’ (société 
anonyme in French) in reference to the public stock corporation, with 
legal personhood and limited liability. Similarly, we differentiate 
between the ‘purpose’ an enterprise can follow (without stipulating 
it in its by-laws) and the ‘corporate purpose’ [objet social] as the for-
mally stated purpose in the by-laws of the corporation.
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substantial privilege bestowed upon a group by the state” 
(Ciepley 2018). The artificial nature of the corporation is 
also evident by virtue of the fact that the corporate contract 
creates a “sempiternal legal person” (Stout 2019), i.e., a per-
son that can in theory exist forever.
The Quest for Corporate Social Responsibility
The model of the corporation as a private and aggregate 
entity has been criticized, mainly with regard to social 
responsibility. Following the early analysis of Dodd (1932), 
scholars have more recently revived the theory of the sepa-
rate legal entity, which considers that, despite being created 
by private initiative, the corporation is an entity distinct from 
its shareholders (Blair and Stout 1999; Biondi et al. 2007; 
Veldman 2018). Thus, the corporation is not only a con-
tract between shareholders formed to maximize their joint 
interests. The creation of a legal entity allows the corpora-
tion, precisely, to be a vehicle for a broader collective effort, 
invested in by multiple stakeholders and oriented towards 
their joint welfare (Blair and Stout 1999; Lan and Heracle-
ous 2010). It is not necessary to include the various stake-
holders as co-contractors in the corporate contract. Instead, 
it must be acknowledged instead that the board is in charge 
both of mediation and of allocating rewards fairly.
This theory of the separate legal entity has been very 
influential in contesting the shareholder view of corporate 
governance. However, does corporate law, as it stands, pro-
vide the appropriate governance to ensure that corporations 
act responsibly? As it is ultimately the shareholders who 
control the board and the top management (Kaufman and 
Englander 2005; Smith and Rönnegard 2016), one can doubt 
that directors have sufficient leeway to consider the vari-
ous stakeholders equally. Even if corporations are under no 
obligation to maximize shareholders’ returns, shareholders 
can be in a position to demand a quick return on their invest-
ment and then withdraw, even to the detriment of long-term 
sustainability (Mac Cormac and Haney 2012). In a nutshell, 
companies can pursue social and environmental goals only 
when their shareholders consent to it (Kaufman and Englan-
der 2005; Sandberg 2011; Yosifon 2014). Today, given the 
huge challenges presented by inequality and climate change, 
scholars have started to discuss possible reforms of corporate 
law. Researchers are not only investigating governance that 
promotes leadership responsibility and sustainable corporate 
behavior (Filatotchev and Nakajima 2014; Starbuck 2014; 
Scherer et al. 2013), but they are also considering a rede-
sign of the corporate form to facilitate sustainability. The 
corporate form “is ailing social technology” (Metcalf and 
Benn 2012); it pursues private interests but presumably with 
no interest in humanity. The legal features of the corporate 
form, such as limited liability, allow for certain irresponsible 
conducts (Ireland 2010; Ciepley 2018; Mayer 2013). And 
this is all the more worrying given that the new technologies 
that are being developed by contemporary corporations, such 
as artificial intelligence, are creating an unpredictable future 
(Mulgan 2018). While it was originally designed to facilitate 
economic development, “the corporate form now threatens 
human survival” (Metcalf and Benn 2012, p. 195).
One of the many proposals designed to reduce corporate 
irresponsibility (e.g., changes in CEO compensation) is to 
allow a majority of the voting stock of a corporation to be 
held by a non-profit organization, or “industrial foundation” 
(Mayer 2013; Ciepley 2018). Such shareholder foundations 
“are normally chartered for combined business and charita-
ble purposes” (Ciepley 2018, p.1015). Their main advantage 
would be to insulate the control of the corporation from the 
influence of short-term shareholders and allow for the needs 
of various stakeholders to be taken into consideration in the 
long run. This is, however, very demanding as it requires 
stocks to be voluntary transferred to non-profit foundations.
International Legal Movements
Two other streams have emerged in the US and the UK: one 
that extends the duties of directors with respect to various 
stakeholders, and one that creates new corporate forms with 
expanded corporate purposes.
Expanding the Duties of Directors
Both the US and the UK preceded France in terms of 
addressing the social and environmental duties of company 
directors. Specifically, the UK Company Act of 2006 stipu-
lates in Section 172 that administrators must act for the suc-
cess of the company and for the benefit of its members, and 
in so doing must consider the effects of their decisions on the 
interests of employees and other parties (Keay 2007). This 
provision followed a wave of constituency statutes in various 
American states that either allowed or required, depending 
on the case, company directors to take into consideration the 
interests of different stakeholders (Bainbridge 1992; Bis-
conti 2009; Orts 1992).
New Corporate Forms with Expanded Purposes
While an expansion of fiduciary duties concerns all compa-
nies, an alternative was to introduce new corporate forms 
as an option rather than an obligation (McMullen and War-
nick 2016). Following the creation of Community Interest 
Companies in England in 2004, the first BCs were intro-
duced in Maryland in the US in 2010. In 2012, California 
simultaneously introduced the BC and the Flexible Purpose 
Corporation [later relabelled the Social Purpose Corpora-
tion (SPC)]. Today, the BC has been adopted in 31 states in 
the US (Hiller 2013) and has spread beyond the US to Latin 
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America and Europe (e.g., Società Benefit in Italy in 2014). 
While profit-with-purpose corporations take several different 
forms, depending on the state, with different missions and 
different evaluation or enforcement mechanisms, the gen-
eral framework is relatively fixed (Clark and Babson 2012; 
Deskins 2012; Hemphill and Cullari 2014; Hiller 2013; 
Michelle 2017; Rawhouser et al. 2015) and can be summa-
rized as follows: they adopt “(i) a corporate purpose to create 
a material positive impact on society and the environment; 
(ii) expanded fiduciary duties of the directors requiring the 
consideration of non-financial interests; and (iii) an obliga-
tion for the corporation to report on its overall social and 
environmental performance” (Hemphill and Cullari 2014, p. 
520). The French reform, as we will see in the next section, 
introduces the same framework in corporate law, but with 
additional features and distinctive justifications.
The Context of the French Reform
The French Reform from a Historical Perspective
While the historical background may be quite similar in 
other countries (Djelic 2013; Ireland 2010; Guinnane et al. 
2007, 2017; Ciepley 2018), it is important to contextual-
ize the present reform in the history of French corporate 
law, in particular regarding the role played by the corporate 
purpose.
In France, following the abolition of guilds and their 
equivalents during the French Revolution, the Civil Code 
under Napoleon formally recognized the possibility of incor-
poration with limited liability, but defined it cautiously. The 
corporation was introduced into commercial law in 1807. 
At the time, the corporate purpose played an essential role, 
revealing a conceptualization of the corporation as both a 
separate legal entity and a state creation:
– First, corporations could no longer be known by the 
names of their owners: “A corporation [société anonyme] 
is anonymous. It is only known by the description of its 
purpose” [the first draft of the code (year IX) in Lefebvre-
Teillard (1985)].
– Second, given the risk of fraud and traps for investors, the 
creation of a corporation was subject to special authori-
zation from the government. This authorization was 
granted following an in-depth examination of the corpo-
rate purpose to see whether the public call for investors 
was justified and whether the company had a chance of 
success.
– Finally, corporate purpose was also a way to define the 
latitude granted to the directors responsible for running 
the business, based on the doctrine of ultra vires
 Examination and authorization procedures gradually came 
to be viewed as increasingly burdensome, but the experience 
helped to develop a series of rules relating to the incorpora-
tion of corporations. The law for instance gradually intro-
duced the requirement of a minimum amount of capital, as 
well as a special auditor (commissaire aux comptes). Follow-
ing numerous heated debates, government authorization was 
finally done away with in 1867 in the name of freedom of 
association. From then on, corporate purpose was no longer 
subject to the formal control of the state, and could be freely 
determined, as long as it was legal (Lefebvre-Teillard 1985).
This freedom has not been called into question since 
then. Several jurists have noted that corporate purpose was 
progressively likened to sectors of activity [“fields of possi-
bilities” (Vernac 2015)] and was often worded very broadly 
(e.g., “for any lawful purpose”) to preclude the risk of direc-
tors overstepping their authorization. To our knowledge, no 
proposals were made in the twentieth century in France to 
reform corporate purpose. It was only recently, in 2017, that 
the concept was taken up again in government reflection.
The Rise of Corporate Purpose as a Policy Issue 
in 2017
In October of that year, President Emmanuel Macron men-
tioned in a televised speech the need to “redefine the enter-
prise” and its purpose. At the time, the French Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Finance had just launched a large-
scale consultation to prepare the PACTE law, the objective 
of which was to rebuild French citizens’ ‘trust’ in business 
(cf. Club des Juristes 2018, p.15).
One of the components of this consultation was a com-
mission that examined issues of value creation through 
governance, the involvement of employees in value crea-
tion (e.g., profit-sharing, employee shareholdings), and 
company stakeholders as contributors to sustainable value 
(Bercy 2017, p. 8). However, even before the report of this 
commission was published, the Ministry of Labour wished 
to strengthen this component and convened a government 
meeting on corporate purpose on 5 January 2018. In addi-
tion to Muriel Pénicaud, the Minister of Labour, the partici-
pants in this meeting were Nicole Belloubet, the Minister of 
Justice, Nicolas Hulot, the Minister for the Ecological and 
Solidary Transition, and Bruno Le Maire, the Minister of 
Economy and Finance. All the social partners (trade union 
leaders) were also invited (Barthet 2018). At this meeting, 
the ministers expressed their wish to prepare a more ambi-
tious reform, and commissioned Nicole Notat and Jean-
Dominique Senard to draw up a report on the relationship 
between corporations and the collective interest. Consider-
ing the growing societal expectations with respect to busi-
ness enterprises, the ministers thought it was necessary to 
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forge a new vision of the firm by examining its role, legal 
framework and mission.
The letter of intent, dated January 11, 2018, shows that 
the task entrusted to Notat and Senard was ambitious, and 
was aimed at reopening a discussion around corporate 
purpose:
Our idea is to open up the field of possibilities and 
consider all levers allowing any stakeholders that so 
desire to give an enterprise a wider corporate purpose 
[objet social]. In short, this means giving an enterprise 
a purpose that is not exclusively guided by short-term 
considerations, thus promoting a vision of capitalism 
that is more respectful of the general interest and that 
of future generations. [our translation]
The schedule was very tight, as the report had to be submit-
ted by March 1, 2018. While various institutional reports 
had been produced over the years on reforming corporate 
purpose, the Notat-Senard Report provided a detailed analy-
sis of the issues and a clear justification for its proposals. It 
played a decisive role by offering a synthesis of previous 
research, and directly informed the government’s draft bill.
The Core Elements of the Law
The report was published in March and the resulting bill did 
the rounds in April. Chapter 3 of the bill concerned “fairer 
businesses,” and the second section was titled “Rethinking 
the place of companies in society.” This section incorporated 
Notat and Senard’s main recommendations, albeit watered 
down. The suggestions of the Notat-Senard Report were 
raised in parliamentary debates, and after several consulta-
tions, the National Assembly validated the report’s sugges-
tions on October 5, 2018. They were partially vetoed by the 
Senate, but finally reintroduced by the National Assembly 
on March 16, 2019. The final version was approved by the 
Senate on April 9, 2019 and by the National Assembly on 
April 11, 2019.
Table 1 summarizes Articles 169 and 176 of the PACTE. 
It shows three key elements of the reform: (1) a “considera-
tion clause,” i.e., the obligation to consider the social and 
environmental implications of a corporation’s activities, (2) 
the possibility for a corporation to define its raison d’être, 
and (3) a new status of société à mission.
The French Reform in Comparison to the US and UK 
Movements
The French reform must not be taken out of its international 
context. In this particular case, it clearly borrows from other 
legislative developments that preceded it, mainly in the US 
and the UK, but the French position differs from the other 
reforms in several ways. The differences can be character-
ized along three main dimensions (see Table 2):
– First, the French law combines two paths that could be 
seen as alternatives: a general obligation for companies 
to consider social and environmental issues, and an 
option for a company to make social and environmental 
commitments.
Table 1  The Key amendments of the Articles 169 and 176 [our translation]
Article 1833 of the Civil Code is completed as follows: “The company should be managed in its own self-interest, while considering the social 
and environmental impact of its operations”
Article 1835 is completed as follows: “By-laws can specify a raison d’être, consisting of the principles that the company adopts, with respect 
for these principles taking place through the company allocating resources to them as a part of its operations”
The Company Law [in the Code of Commerce] is modified. Extract:
“Art. L. 210–10.—A société à mission is a corporation that has a raison d’être in line with Article 1835 of the Civil Code, the by-laws of 
which:
“1. Define a mission of pursuing social and environmental goals in accordance with its raison d’être;
“2. Define the composition, operation, and means of a corporate body, separate from the bodies established by the present book, which must 
contain at least one employee, and which is exclusively responsible for successfully fulfilling the mission indicated in Item 1”
Table 2  The French reform in comparison to the US and UK reforms
General path: expansion of fiduciary duties for company directors France: Optional path
raison d’être
Optional path: creation of a company with an extended corporate purpose
Authorization for com-
pany directors to take 
multiple stakeholders 
into account
Requirement for directors to take multiple stakehold-
ers (or the legal entity) into account
Possibility for a com-
pany to formulate its
raison d’être
Company commitment 
based on standardized 
criteria
Company commitment based on a specific purpose
e.g., Constituency statutes e.g., UK Company Act France: Corporate interest 
(interest of the legal 
entity) while consider-
ing social and environ-
mental implications
Benefit corporations:
Evaluation standard
Third-party auditing
SPC:
Purpose
Public reporting
France:
Mission
With a distinct committee 
representing multiple 
stakeholders to evaluate 
the respect of the purpose
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– Second, concerning the general obligation, the French 
law, like the UK one, stipulates that companies must be 
managed in the corporate interest [intérêt social]. How-
ever, while the UK law defines the success of the com-
pany as the objective, and the means to ensure that the 
stakeholders’ interests are taken into consideration, the 
French law stresses that the company’s interests do not 
guarantee the consideration of social and environmental 
aspects. The idea is not only to manage a company in its 
own interests, but also expressly to consider the social 
and environmental impacts of its operations.
– Third, regarding the option to make social and environ-
mental commitments, the French law, contrary to US 
BCs (but similar to SPCs), does not establish standard-
ized assessment frameworks, leaving it up to the sociétés 
à mission to define both their mission and their evalua-
tion methods. It does nonetheless require the creation 
of a special committee to monitor the execution of the 
mission and to report to the board, as opposed to SPCs, 
which leave it entirely up to the board of directors to 
evaluate the strategy with respect to the mission (in 
which case a decree must subsequently specify the pub-
licity and reporting methods).
Theoretical Background: A New Positive 
View of the Enterprise
While they have many similarities, the starkest contrast 
between the French reform and those in other countries con-
cerns their justification. The Notat -Senard Report follows 
the US movement’s analysis of the limitations of corporate 
law in relation to corporate responsibility, but it differs in 
its ‘positive’ approach to the enterprise. Usually, as noted 
above, the enterprise is seen as the substratum of the corpo-
ration: the ‘economic activities.’ By ‘positive approach’ we 
mean, on the contrary, the elements that characterize the dis-
tinctive features of the enterprise. While business organiza-
tions or ‘organized economic activities’ have always existed, 
the enterprise has a recent history and a specific rationale. 
To justify its proposals, it builds upon academic research 
to advance a new view of the enterprise, with a purpose of 
collective creation.
Rather than considering enterprises as the root cause of 
our current sustainability challenges, the report suggests 
reversing the viewpoint, arguing that enterprises are “a part 
of the solution.” Its recommendations are based on three 
original positions: (i) the ‘enterprise’ (entreprise) must be 
distinguished from its legal vehicle, which is the company 
(société); (ii) it is the collective capacity to create that distin-
guishes the enterprise and that contributes to the collective 
interest; and (iii) defining the raison d’être of the enterprise 
within the corporate contract protects the enterprise in this 
capacity, and therefore also protects the collective interest.
Let us consider these propositions in detail.
Collective Creation as the Driver of the Modern 
Enterprise
Based on past research (Robé 1999, 2011), the Notat-Sen-
ard Report starts by emphasizing the importance of distin-
guishing the enterprise [entreprise] from the corporation 
[société]. In terms of French law, the corporation is formed 
by shareowners who agree, by contract, to appropriate prop-
erty for a common venture. But employees, for instance, 
are not part of this contract; they are only a third party. The 
enterprise, which is the term currently used to denote the 
organization invested primarily by employees and managers, 
is not defined in the law.
The Report adds a historical perspective, based on recent 
academic work (Segrestin and Hatchuel 2012; Favereau 
2014; Favereau and Roger 2015), to distinguish between 
the corporation and the enterprise. While the corporation 
was liberalized in France in 1867 (and also around the mid-
nineteenth century in England, Germany and the United 
States), the modern enterprise only emerged at the very end 
of the nineteenth century. It was not until the beginning of 
the twentieth century that the employment contract [contrat 
de travail] replaced the personal service contract [contrat 
de louage], which was classified in the ‘law of things’ and 
was highly contractual and commercial in nature, such as 
client − supplier contracts between the employee and the 
employer (Deakin 2009) (Notat-Senard Report, pp. 25 − 26). 
This was also the period during which professional manage-
ment and the role of executives emerged as distinct func-
tions, separate from those of directors. Why has the enter-
prise, with its complex contractual relationships, emerged?
The report suggests that the modern enterprise emerged 
during this period not only as a result of industrial develop-
ment and the concentration of capital. The modern enter-
prise cannot be fully comprehended as an alternative model 
of production (Perrow 2002), nor as an integration of various 
functions designed to address the growing complexity of 
industrial activities (Chandler 1990). It can be understood 
only by considering the rise of a new regime of activity 
that emerged when technical inventions and technological 
progress were becoming collective and organized activities, 
and a new generation of engineers and researchers began 
to join companies. “They became aware that invention is 
an activity that can (and must) be both collective and gov-
erned” (Segrestin and Hatchuel 2012, p. 27, quoted on page 
25 of the Notat-Senard Report). It is “collective creation, 
inventive activities, and the organization of innovation that 
constitute the core of the industrial enterprise, and that 
When the Law Distinguishes Between the Enterprise and the Corporation: The Case of the New French…
1 3
grant it its legitimacy” (p. 25, our translation). New types of 
organization emerged to organize and systematize innova-
tion, and with them new industrial relationships arose. Pro-
fessional management and business administration courses 
appeared. Supplier − purchaser-style contracts with workers 
were clearly no longer sufficient, for to develop electricity, 
automobiles, or synthetic fertilizers, it was necessary to 
develop new competencies and new methods. The employ-
ment contract, based on the principle of subordination, was 
seen as a way to train workers and to make them adopt new 
and changing collective methods.
This distinction between the enterprise and the cor-
poration, and the conceptualization of the enterprise as a 
dynamic of collective creation are borrowed from academic 
research (Segrestin and Hatchuel 2012) and play a central 
role in the Notat-Senard Report, in which the term ‘collec-
tive creation’ appears nine times: the enterprise is “created 
only if it addresses a specific need, and remains only if it 
maintains a dynamic of invention, innovation, and collective 
creation” (p. 4, our translation).
Collective Creation: Why the Enterprise Must be 
Protected
From this point of view, Notat and Senard note a kind of his-
torical mismatch between the law and the rise of the modern 
enterprise. During the twentieth century, different branches 
of the law had to deal with the enterprise, primarily labor 
law, but also areas such as competition law and tax law. 
However, corporate governance remained within the domain 
of corporate law, which hardly changed at all. Business offic-
ers have continued to be hired and mandated by shareholders 
in accordance with the rule of corporate law as if there had 
been no fundamental transformation of business organiza-
tions from classical companies to modern enterprises.
While the innovative aspect of the enterprise contributes 
to the general interest, the paradox pointed out by the Notat-
Senard Report is that governance practices tend to “empty 
the enterprise of its substance” (p. 19). For example, the 
short-termism of investors can limit R&D efforts (Auvray 
et al. 2016). Therefore, the issue is, above all, not to relin-
quish profits, but to restore the role of the enterprise and its 
capacity to generate value beyond profits.
Raison d’être as a Way to Protect the Enterprise
From this distinction between the enterprise and the cor-
poration, the Report concludes that the enterprise has until 
now been lacking a legal vehicle consistent with its creative 
nature. Because of its innovative nature, the enterprise can 
affect the society and the environment both negatively or 
positively. Thus, the following legal changes are suggested:
– On the negative impact of the enterprise, this led to the 
recommendation to amend the Civil Code by adding a 
‘consideration clause’ to Article 1833: The enterprise 
cannot be run in the sole interests of the shareholders 
or in the interests of the private corporation. Corporate 
law should consider the activities and their social and 
environmental impacts. No enterprise should be managed 
without due regard to the impacts of the related activities.
– On the positive contribution of the enterprise, the report 
recommends two additional provisions: the board of any 
corporation can define the raison d’être [of its enterprise]; 
and if the shareholders so desire, the raison d’être can be 
translated into objectives written into the by-laws, thus 
making it a contractual commitment. Accordingly, the 
entreprise à mission status defines its purpose with spe-
cific social and environmental objectives in the by-laws. 
Here again, the report draws on academic research (Seg-
restin et al. 2015; Levillain 2017). The entreprise à mission 
makes CSR initiatives credible and avoids greenwashing as 
the objectives contractually bind the corporation. By speci-
fying the mandate of directors, the contractual objectives 
also increase directors’ leeway to refuse excessive demands 
for profits from shareholders. The entreprise à mission thus 
secures long-term collective efforts for desirable futures.
 From our point of view, the combination of these three 
points (a consideration clause, defining a raison d’être, 
and entreprise à mission status) defines the Notat-Senard 
Report’s scope and originality. All three elements have now 
been enshrined in the law.
Discussion: Enriching our Theories 
of the Corporation
The PACTE law has just passed in France and it is too early 
and out of the scope of our paper to analyze the practical con-
sequences of the changes it introduced. Modifying the purpose 
of the corporation is obviously something that has raised ques-
tions, and several commentators have already expressed their 
concerns, which often overlap with debates in the UK and 
the US. For instance, will this change be a source of rapidly 
increasing litigation (Yosifon 2017)? Will entreprises à mis-
sion only concern a small number of companies? Will green-
washing actually be prevented (Rawhouser et al. 2015)? How-
ever, beyond these issues, the theoretical reach of the French 
law has frequently been pointed out.8 Next, we examine more 
closely some of the theoretical implications of this reform.
8 Some commentators speak not only of a change in mindset “by 
taking the general interest on board in their concerns,” but also of 
a “paradigm shift,” a “renewal of liberalism,” or even “a concep-
tual revolution”; the law is seen to create “a fundamental hole in the 
‘Friedmannian’ conceptualization.”
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Is the Corporation the Appropriate Vehicle 
for the Enterprise? Towards an Enriched Theory 
of the Corporation
The French law brings to light a parameter that was pre-
viously not visible in the approach to the corporation. As 
noted above, the theories of the corporation have fluctuated 
in two respects: the aggregate versus separate entity dimen-
sion, and the private/natural initiative versus state creation 
dimension. The Notat-Senard Report mentions these con-
troversial issues. However, it suggests a need to change the 
focus: in both dimensions, the questions of what the activity 
of the enterprise will be, and what the enterprise will effec-
tively do to society, play no role.
The distinction introduced earlier between the enterprise 
and the corporation is fully realized here. This absence of 
a reference to the activity of the enterprise has largely con-
tributed to the unhinging of the corporate framework from 
contemporary business. Since the mid-nineteenth century, 
the corporation has been a legal tool concerned only with 
share capital: (i) some owners contribute to the share capi-
tal by investing their assets; (ii) the corporation is formed 
as a legal entity, which owns the share capital; and (iii) the 
constitutional contract defines the respective rights—includ-
ing the control rights—and liabilities of the asset provid-
ers. Rajan and Zingales (2000) noted that in the nineteenth 
century, the ownership of capital ensured the ownership 
of the means of production and therefore value creation. 
However, is this approach still valid today? Rajan and Zin-
gales consider that in modern economies, “since ownership 
is relatively unimportant, and human capital is not tied to 
inanimate assets, the legal definition of the firm, which 
centers around the ownership of the inanimate assets, is not 
very helpful” (Rajan and Zingales 2000). However, Rajan 
and Zingales continue to see the enterprise as the “unit of 
economic organization” (Ibid., p. 25), and do not make any 
proposal to change the law. By contrast, the French reform 
is based on the idea of a historical differentiation between 
classical capitalist organizations and modern ones, arguing 
that the creative nature of the modern enterprise calls for a 
change in the law. By virtue of its creative nature, modern 
enterprises can change the world, just as BASF in the early 
twentieth century with its synthetic fertilizers and as Mon-
santo more recently with its glyphosate, changed the world 
(positively or negatively). Corporate law allows them to do 
so, in the interests of the shareowners, or at best in the inter-
ests of the corporation itself. This can explain in part why 
the corporation has become an “ailing social technology” 
(Metcalf and Benn 2012).
The main theoretical implication, from our standpoint, 
derives from the new view of the enterprise. As noted above, 
the literature has already distinguished the enterprise, as an 
economic (productive) organization, from its legal vehicle, 
the corporation. But if we follow the French argument, the 
enterprise is not just an economic organization, nor is it 
just a productive organization; it is a creative organization. 
Therefore, we must recognize that although the corporation 
was conceived as the legal vehicle for productive commer-
cial activity, it is not necessarily the appropriate legal vehicle 
for the creative enterprise (see Table 3).
Therefore, the question is, what is the appropriate legal 
vehicle for the enterprise? How should the law recognize the 
creative enterprise and hold it responsible?
Purpose‑Driven Corporations as the Legal Form 
for Responsible Enterprises?
In this respect, it seems that the French reform does a good 
job of making visible the activities of the enterprise and their 
effects, as it mentions both the impact of those activities 
and their purpose in the law. Thus, it informs the growing 
body of research that explores the possible linkages between 
corporate law and corporate responsibility (Aguilera et al. 
2015; Ciepley 2018, Filatotchev and Nakajima 2014; Gran-
dori 2019; Mayer 2013; Scherer and Voegtlin 2017).
Table 3  The distinction between enterprise and corporation revisited
Economic activity Legal vehicle
Productive activity Organization engaged in productive activity
“Organized economic activity” (Robé 2011, p. 3)
“An organization engaged in the production of goods or ser-
vices, to which end it combines physical, human and virtual 
assets” (Deakin 2012, p. 350)
“Unit of economic organization, which they call the 
‘enterprise’”(Rajan and Zingales 2000, p. 24)
Corporation
“A legal mechanism, and the principal legal-institutional 
device through which business firms operate in contem-
porary market economies” (Deakin 2012, p. 351)
“Constitutional contract” (Grandori 2010)
“Separate legal entity” (Blair and Stout 1999)
“Ownership of assets” (Rajan and Zingales 2000, p. 25)
Creative activity Entreprise
“Organization of collective creation processes” (Segrestin and 
Hatchuel 2011)
“Organized collective creation” (Segrestin and Hatchuel 2012; 
Notat and Senard 2018)
When the Law Distinguishes Between the Enterprise and the Corporation: The Case of the New French…
1 3
In terms of social and environmental responsibilities, the 
French reform introduces a new proposal that revisits the 
classical debate on the nature of the corporation as either a 
private initiative or a state one. The specification of a raison 
d’être or mission means that the corporate purpose cannot be 
reduced to the interests of the shareowners, thereby clearly 
implying that the corporation is a separate legal entity. But 
it goes further than that: the private interest of the corpo-
ration cannot be the sole guide for business leaders. The 
corporation must avoid negative impacts and must integrate 
due regard to social and environmental impacts. It can also 
pursue positive impacts and integrate other parties’ interests, 
and even the public interest. Interestingly, the new French 
law proposes a path that goes beyond the classical opposi-
tion between the corporation viewed as private or a state ini-
tiative. The purpose of the corporation is freely determined 
by private initiative but does not amount to a private interest.
Second, the French reform introduces a new conceptual-
ization of the enterprise, one that is not limited to a for-profit 
organization. By referring to the activities of the enterprise 
beyond the constitution of joint stock for the corporation, it 
makes the enterprise exist legally. In this way, the French 
reform builds upon former cases. For instance, industrial 
foundations are already set up with a clear commitment to a 
purpose. However, most of the time, industrial foundations 
are seen as a way of combining the profit objective with a 
charitable one (Ciepley 2018). Fundamentally, they do not 
change the view that the enterprise is a for-profit ‘economic 
organization,’ devoted to maximizing profits. By contrast, 
the French law stipulates that the enterprise can be intrinsi-
cally constituted to pursue broader and more diverse aims. 
The purpose of the enterprise’s activities needs to be speci-
fied because the entrepreneurial aim is not necessarily to 
maximize profits. In other words, the definition of the raison 
d’être in the law makes visible the enterprise as an entity 
distinct from the corporation, and allows entrepreneurial 
projects to pursue goals other than profit maximization.
Finally, we believe that the French reform has paved 
the way for a new approach to corporate responsibility. It 
is now acknowledged that responsible businesses must not 
only “avoid doing harm” but also aim to “do good” (Scherer 
and Voegtlin 2017). In this respect, the innovative capabili-
ties of the enterprise raise concerns as well as expectations. 
Business enterprises can contribute to alleviating hunger or 
speeding up the transition to renewable energy sources. By 
defining their purpose, corporations can now make explicit 
how they see their responsibility, that is, the contribution 
they intend to make, and to which they are committed.
As Grinbaum and Groves (2013) noted, “we have to 
acknowledge that the responsibility associated with inno-
vation necessarily is responsibility for the future it helps 
to create” (Grinbaum and Groves 2013). In this respect, 
purpose-driven corporations provide new and promising 
legal foundations for enhanced CSR.
Conclusion
In essence, the French reform changes the framework of 
business responsibility in two ways. First, it obliges corpo-
rations to run their business with due regard to the impacts 
of their activities. Second, it opens up the possibility of a 
company defining its raison d’être and becoming, on a vol-
untary basis, a société à mission. Thus, a company can adopt 
a purpose that does not renounce profit-making or shareown-
ers’ interests, but that expressly includes the pursuit of social 
and environmental goals.
In this study, we have shown that France’s recent reform 
is part of an international movement, but is underpinned 
by novel theoretical arguments. The reform introduces a 
new conceptualization of the enterprise as an organization 
that has emerged with a creative purpose. We argue that 
this new conceptualization has important theoretical impli-
cations. First, it shows that the corporation is not only the 
legal form of its economic activities. It is also a special form 
historically conceived for productive activities, but not nec-
essarily appropriate for the creative nature of contemporary 
enterprises. Second, it invites us to add a new dimension to 
the theories of the corporation, that of the purpose, the con-
tribution to the world that the enterprise intends to achieve.
Clearly, the practical effects of this new form of govern-
ance remain to be evaluated. However, at this stage, the 
positive view of the enterprise that is embedded in this law 
invites researchers in business ethics to explore new legal 
and governance frameworks that are appropriate for con-
temporary enterprises.
In this way, the French proposal calls for important 
further research. It will, of course, be useful to follow the 
effects of this legal change at various levels: who is adopting 
société à mission status, what are their missions and how are 
they evaluated? Does the reform protect and secure CSR, 
and does it offer an effective framework for responsible inno-
vation? More generally, the new law challenges our theories 
of the corporation and suggests that it is possible to conceive 
alternative forms of business law. Thus, it calls for further 
research to explore alternative legal frameworks for innova-
tive and responsible enterprises in the twenty-first century.
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